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INTRODUCTION
President Bush's veto of the Kennedy-Hawkins Civil Rights Bill,
dashed the hopes many Americans had for a rebuilding of civil rights
legislation, legislation that had been systematically undermined by
recent Supreme Court cases.2 This dismantling of civil rights legisla-
1. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S9966-68 (daily ed. July
18, 1990). See also 136 CONG. REC. S16,457-58 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (veto
message of President Bush). The Civil Rights Bill of 1990 was drafted in part to
overrule Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1988) protection as to contracts does not extend to postformation incidents
of racial harassment). Specifically, section 12 of the bill addressed the issue of post-
contract racial discrimination. Section 12 would have amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by
modifying the right to "make and enforce contracts" to include the "making, per-
formance, modification and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all bene-
fits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship." S. 2104, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 12, 136 CONG. REC. at S9968 (daily ed. July 18, 1990).
The state of Minnesota has taken steps to provide the protections which the Pat-
terson decision and the veto of the Civil Rights Bill of 1990 have denied. See MINN.
STAT. § 363.03, subd. 8a(c) (1990). On May 3, 1990, Governor Rudy Perpich signed
a human rights bill which specifically reversed the effects of Patterson by making it an
unfair practice to "intentionally . . . discriminate in the basic terms, conditions, or
performance of [a] contract because of a person's race, color, sex, or disability ... 
Id.
2. See 136 CONG. REC. E3567 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Stokes). Immediately after President Bush's veto, Rep. Hawkins, co-author of the
1
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tion is evident from a line of Supreme Court cases going back to
1989. These cases show the Court's willingness to curtail the expan-
sive interpretation civil rights statutes once enjoyed.3
The Court's dismantling of civil rights legislation began with Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.4 In Wards Cove, a class action suit was
brought by members of several ethnic minority groups. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the hiring practices of two Alaskan salmon canner-
ies, and the disparate adverse impact wrought by those hiring
practices, violated Title VII.5 The Court held that a prima facie
showing of disparate impact 6 could not be made by merely establish-
Civil Rights Bill of 1990, reportedly issued a statement accusing President Bush of
leading " 'a national retreat from civil rights.... By relying on the same shopworn
excuses and code words that were offered against every great piece of civil rights
legislation, George Bush plays on the worst of America's fears, and the worst of
America's prejudices.'" Id. (quoting Trescott, The Long Haul of Rep. Gus Hawkins-At
83, the Steady Champion of Civil Rights is Retiring From a Battle That Won't End, Washing-
ton Post, Oct. 24, 1990).
3. See generally Address by William B. Allen, Chairman, U.S. Commission on
Human Rights, Heritage Foundation Lecture (Aug. 24, 1989) (NEXIS, News Makers
& Policy Makers section). Allen noted:
"[W]hile each of the recent Supreme Court decisions turned on what the
administration has called 'technical legal issues,' the problem arises from
the fact that, taken all together, these decisions show a systematic tilt against
civil rights claims." Apparently, therefore, we witness a building consensus
that, while the Supreme Court has applied the law aptly, which is to say
even-handedly, an even-handed application of the law is insufficient.
Id.
4. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
5. Id. at 647. The claim was based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988), which
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
Id. The canneries had a practice of hiring mostly nonwhites, especially Filipinos and
Alaskan natives, for unskilled "cannery" positions. Skilled "noncannery" positions,
such as machinists, however, were filled, for the most part, with white applicants. See
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647 & n.3. Furthermore, the noncannery positions paid more
than the unskilled cannery positions, and the noncannery employees were provided
with sleeping and eating arrangements separate from the cannery employees. Id.
6. The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1988)) to proscribe "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). Under the disparate impact doctrine, "a facially neutral employment practice
may be deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employer's objective
intent to discriminate .... " Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 646.
[Vol. 17
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ing statistical imbalances in the racial composition of certain jobs. 7
The majority sought to further the legislative intent of Title VII to
create a color blind society.8 The majority fell short of this goal.
The Court's virtual destruction of the disparate impact doctrine will
effectively prevent minorities from using the federal courts to help in
overcoming racial barriers to fair and equal employment. In his dis-
sent, Justice Blackmun noted: "One wonders whether the majority
still believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race dis-
crimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even
remembers that it ever was." 9
In Martin v. Wilks,1o white firefighters employed by the city of Bir-
mingham, Alabama, challenged certain affirmative action consent de-
crees. The white employees asserted that favorable treatment in
hiring and promotions for African-American firefighters "constituted
impermissible racial discrimination in violation of the Constitution
and federal statute."" I Following a trial, the district court granted a
motion to dismiss the white firefighters' claims "as impermissible
collateral attacks on the consent decrees."12 The circuit court, how-
ever, reversed, stating that because the white firefighters, suing in
their individual capacities, " 'were neither parties nor privies to the
consent decrees .... their independent claims of unlawful discrimi-
nation [were] not precluded.' "'1s The Supreme Court, upholding
the circuit court, ruled that parties not joined in a consent decree
could collaterally attack the decree's affirmative action plan.14 In do-
ing so, the Court substituted rules which unfairly burden minorities
by subjecting judicially approved affirmative action plans to recon-
sideration for procedural rules unique to Title VII cases.' 5 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens stated that, "Ulust as white employees in the
past were innocent beneficiaries of illegal discriminatory practices,
so is it inevitable that some of the same white employees will be in-
nocent victims who must share some of the burdens resulting from
7. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 653-54.
8. See The Supreme Court, 1988-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 359 (1989)
(The legislative history of Title VII indicates that the aim of the legislation was equal
treatment of all individuals, regardless of race.) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
9. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 679 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. 490 U.S. 755 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 932 (1989).
11. Id. at 758. The consent decrees were the result of litigation commenced by
the NAACP and individual plaintiffs in 1974. Id. at 759. The decrees "set forth an
extensive remedial scheme, including long-term and interim annual goals for the hir-
ing of blacks as firefighters. The decrees also provided for goals for promotion of
blacks within the department." Id..
12. Id. at 760.
13. Id. at 761 (quoting Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litiga-
tion, 833 F.2d 1492, 1498 ((11th Cir. 1987)).
14. Martin, 490 U.S. at 761-62; see also Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 310-20.
15. See Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 311.
1991]
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the redress of the past wrongs."1 6
The Supreme Court completed the dismantling of civil rights leg-
islation in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.17 In Patterson, the Court
considered whether the victim of racial harrassment at the hands of a
private employer could sue that employer under that portion of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 protecting the right to make and enforce contracts.' 8
The Court reconsidered Runyon v. McCrary,' 9 a 1976 case, where the
Court had held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applied to private acts of dis-
crimination.20 Although the Court ultimately upheld Runyon, 21 the
narrow and stilted interpretation of section 1981 set forth in Patterson
contradicts the much broader interpretation given that statute in
Runyon.22
The Court ignored the legislative history of section 1981,23 and
16. Martin, 490 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
18. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 170-71; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
19. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
20. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171-73 (referring to Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160). Run-
yon involved a class action suit brought on behalf of several African-American chil-
dren by the children's parents. The plaintiffs challenged as violative of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 the racially discriminatory admission practices of several private schools. See
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 163-64. In ruling that section 1981 did indeed bar acts of private
discrimination, the Court stated that "[iut is now well established that [section 1981]
prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts."
Id at 168 (citation omitted). The Court, in reviewing prior decisions regarding sec-
tion 1981, interpreted the protections of section 1981 as broad and sweeping. The
Court reiterated that section 1981 "unequivocally' . .. 'affords a federal remedy
against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.'" Id. at 172 (quot-
ing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)).
21. The Court refused to overrule Runyon, stating:
[N]o special justification has been shown for overruling Runyon. In cases
where statutory precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the
Court's shift in position has been the intervening development of the law,
through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by
Congress.
Id. at 173.
22. The majority held that the right to make contracts, found in section 1981,
applied exclusively to precontractual conduct. Id. at 175-77. Specifically, the Court
stated:
[T]he right to make contracts does not extend as a matter of either logic or
semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been
established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of
discriminatory working conditions. Such postformation conduct does not
involve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance
of established contract obligations and the conditions of continuing employ-
ment, matters more naturally governed by state contract law and Title VII.
Id. at 177.
23. Advocates of textualism assert that the Court should interpret only the literal
meaning of a statute rather than the statute's legislative past. See Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 23 (1988) [hereinafter Aleinikoff]. In de-
fense of this approach, Justice Jackson argued:
[Vol. 17
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instead applied a literal and overly narrow "plain meaning" 24 inter-
pretation to "the same right ... to make and enforce contracts." 25
This interpretation is inconsistent with the prevailing interpretation
of the statute's legislative purpose 26 and in sharp contrast to the ex-
pansive interpretation afforded civil rights legislation in recent
decades.27
This Comment first examines the legislative history of section
198 l's predecessor-the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Second, three ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation are discussed: the "intentional-
ist" approach; 28 the "textualist" approach; 29 and, the "dynamic"
Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is ines-
capably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee
reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared....
The Rules of the House and Senate, with the sanction of the Constitution,
require three readings of an Act in each House before final enactment. That
is intended, I take it, to make sure that each House knows what it is passing
and passes what it wants, and that what is enacted was formally reduced to
writing.... Moreover, it is only the words of the bill that have presidential
approval, where that approval is given. It is not to be supposed that, in
signing a bill, the President endorses the whole Congressional Record....
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever
possible the meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are in-
tended for all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to
learn what their rights under those laws are. Here is a controversy which
affects every little merchant in many States. Aside from a few offices in the
larger cities, the materials of legislative history are not available to the law-
yer who can afford neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing, or the
cost of repeatedly examining the whole congressional history. Moreover, if
he could, he would not know any way of anticipating what would impress
enough members of the Court to be controlling.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951). See also
S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYsTEM 250 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter S. MERMIN].
24. The majority opinion made little reference to the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, relying instead on the literal meaning of section 1981. See,
e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175-76.
25. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
26. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 205-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. See generally Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding
that Title VII allowed the Agency to promote women over men with greater seniority
to jobs significantly underrepresented by women); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that an affirmative action plan which gave pri-
ority in promotions to African-Americans did not violate Title VII); Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that section 1981 was applicable to private acts
of discrimination).
28. Advocates of intentionalism contend:
It would be anomalous to close our minds to persuasive evidence of inten-
tion on the ground that reasonable men could not differ as to the meaning
1991]
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approach.S0 Third, an analysis of section 1981 cases leading up to
Patterson is presented, applying the three approaches to statutory in-
terpretation previously mentioned. This analysis demonstrates the
Court's movement away from previous textual or literal interpreta-
tions of section 1981 to an "intentionalist" approach. The analysis
illustrates how, as new circumstances arise which reveal ambiguities
within section 1981's legislative past, the Court has begun to inter-
pret section 1981 with reference to current societal, political and
legal beliefs consistent with the statute's legislative history-a char-
acteristically dynamic approach. Finally, this Comment proposes a
model for applying the three theories of statutory interpretation and
concludes that a dynamic approach to Patterson renders the most ra-
tional result.
I. HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTs AcT OF 1866
The origins of section 1981 date back to the post-Civil War Recon-
struction Congress. 3 ' President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclama-
tion set in motion Congressional action to free African-Americans.3 2
Slavery, which Congress once intended to make permanent by a con-
stitutional amendment,3 3 was now considered a "moral impossibil-
of the words. Legislative materials may be without probative value, or con-
tradictory, or ambiguous, it is true, and in such cases will not be permitted
to control the customary meaning of words or overcome rules of syntax or
construction found by experience to be workable; they can scarcely be
deemed to be incompetent or irrelevant. The meaning to be ascribed to an
Act of Congress can only be derived from a considered weighing of every
relevant aid to construction.
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940) (citation omitted).
29. See supra note 23.
30. See infra note 65.
31. The prevailing view is that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a recodification of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. This view holds that the Enforcement Act of 1870 and its codifi-
cation in 1874 had no effect on the original Civil Rights Act. See Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,459-60 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-
43, 443 n.78 (1968). The contrary view is that the Civil Rights Act was repealed and
section 16 of the 1870 Enforcement Act was recodified as section 1981. The basis for
this argument is a note appended to the revised statutes which does not mention the
Civil Rights Act as the statute which was updated by section 1981. See Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 207 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
32. 6 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILAION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRES-
IDENTS 157-59 (1898) [hereinafterJ. RICHARDSON]. President Lincoln proclaimed all
slaves to be "forever free." To initiate the emancipation of slaves, Lincoln recom-
mended that Congress grant aid to those states which implement the "immediate or
gradual abolishment of slavery...." H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW 253-54 (1982).
33. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 40-46 (1973) [hereinafter MORE PERFECT
UNION]. The proposed amendment was to be irrepealable and unamendable. The
[Vol. 17
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ity" by President Lincoln.34 The reconstructionist policies of
President Johnson, however, breathed new life into the old southern
institution of slavery by shifting a substantial amount of power back
to the Southern states. This allowed Southerners to legislate the
transition from slavery to freedom, and thus enabled the Southern
states to severely restrict the basic civil rights of Southern African-
Americans.3 5
These policies were embodied in the Black Codes enacted by the
Southern states.36 In his opening remarks to the Senate in 1865,
Senator Lymann Trumbull of Illinois criticized the Black Codes for
discriminating against the freedmen because the codes "still im-
pose[d] upon [African-Americans] . . . the very restrictions which
were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of slavery,
and before it was abolished." 3 7 The Black Codes reflected the desire
of Southerners to cling to the old social order.38 Growing concern
that the South was reverting to its old ways and thus making a
"mockery" out of the thirteenth amendment spurred Congress to
pass a resolution making public a report written for President John-
son regarding the postwar condition of the South.3 9 The report,
prepared by Major General Carl Schurz, stated:
The general government of the republic has, by proclaiming the
emancipation of slaves, commenced a great revolution in the south,
but has, as yet, not completed it. Only the negative part of it is
amendment would have provided citizens the right to move into all nations and terri-
tories with all property they possessed, including slaves, and would have provided
protection for that property. Id.
34. J. RICMRDSON, supra note 32, at 189-91. Lincoln, opposed to such legisla-
tion, wrote: "[W]hile I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or
modify the emancipation proclamation, nor shall I return to slavery any person who
is free by the terms of that proclamation or by any of the acts of Congress." Id. at
190.
35. H. BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: PoLrrIcS AND CONSTrrUIONAL-
ISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 113-14 (1978). See also E. FONER, RECONSTRUCrION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 189 (1988) (President Johnson's reconstruction
policy empowered white southerners to define the status of African-Americans' civil
rights); Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of
Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 548 (1989) [hereinafter Sullivan].
36. The Black Codes prohibited African-Americans from bearing arms, traveling
freely among the states, educating former slaves, and preaching the Gospel. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
37. Id. But see Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1955) (Bickel suggests that Senator Trumbull exaggerated the
severity of the Black Codes in order to persuade Congress to pass his bill.).
38. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). See also Franklin, The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 1135, 1141 (1990).
39. S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1865) (message of President
Johnson accompanied by report submitted to President by Major General Carl
Schurz regarding the racial animus of the South towards African-Americans and
Union supporters). See also Sullivan, supra note 35, at 548-51.
1991]
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accomplished. The slaves are emancipated in point of form, but
free labor has not yet been put in the place of slavery in point of
fact. 4 0
According to Major General Schurz, African-Americans in the South
were being coerced into discriminatory labor contracts and punished
indiscriminately, as though the old system of slavery was still in
place.41 Schurz's report included disturbing narratives depicting the
severe physical abuse many former slaves were still being subjected
to.42 The report also noted that some Southerners still viewed the
now free African-Americans as property.4 3
Scholars have debated the relevance of the Schurz report. In
1968, Justice Harlan wrote, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,44 that the
Schurz report had little influence on the drafting of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, as the report was rarely mentioned in the congressional
debates.45 A close analysis reveals, however, that this report was
Senator Trumbull's principal resource in drafting his bill.46 More-
over, the subject matter of the report was discussed at length during
the debates.47 Therefore, a more plausible argument is that Con-
gress was so familiar with the report that direct reference was
40. S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1865). The main issue viewed
by Northerners and Southerners alike was free labor. The key to freedom for Afri-
can-Americans was embedded in this issue. After a century of slavery, Southerners
were not willing to negotiate labor contracts with their former slaves. See Sullivan,
supra note 35, at 549.
41. See generally S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-108 (1865).
42. Id. at 88. The report noted one incident where an elderly African-American
man was beaten about the head with a rod one inch in diameter "so severe[ly] as to
snap the stick asunder," and another where a woman received a fractured skull and
broken arm by the hand of a "vindictive planter." Id.
43. Id. at 89.
The following is a literal copy of a document brought to this office by a
colored man, which is conclusive evidence that there are those who still
claim the negro as their property:
"This boy Calvin has permit to hire to whome he please, but I shall hold him
as my propperty untill set Free by Congress. July the 7, 1865.
E.V. TULLY."
Id. (original emphasis).
44. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
45. Id. at 462 n.28 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (In contrast, the majority found the
Schurz report to be one of the most comprehensive studies before Congress.).
46. Sullivan, supra note 35, at 553 n.78.
47. Id. at 553. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1865) (Sena-
tor Wilson cited instances similar to those noted in the Schurz report which illus-
trated the oppressive and cruel treatment of African-American slaves in the South.);
Id. at 93-95 (Senator Sumner cited activities by plantation owners to quash the free
labor system and withhold wages from laborers.). See also Sullivan, supra note 35, at
562. Furthermore, the Senate's interest in this report was so great that it passed a
resolution requiring that President Johnson release the report to the public. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1865).
[Vol. 17
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The prevailing conditions in the southern states, as evidenced in
the Schurz report, prompted Congress to take concrete actions
based upon its new thirteenth amendment authority.49 The thir-
teenth amendment was added to the Constitution with the hope that
"the Negro [would be] elevated to legal and civil equality, [and con-
sequently,] the pulsing heart [of slavery] would be stilled and all the
appendages would soon atrophy and disappear." 50 To accomplish
this, Senator Trumbull felt that a congressional enactment was nec-
essary to give credibility and force to the thirteenth amendment.51
In his opening remarks to the Senate, he stated that his civil rights
bill
is intended to give effect to [the thirteenth amendment] and secure
to all persons within the United States practical freedom. There is
very little importance in the general declaration of abstract truths
and principles unless they can be carried into effect, unless the per-
sons who are to be affected by them have some means of availing
themselves of their benefits. 52
In the debates that followed, several congressmen called for the
total eradication of racial discrimination.53 Senator Trumbull al-
luded to such a broad application of his civil rights bill by comment-
ing that under the thirteenth amendment, Congress had the
authority to pass a bill "much more sweeping and efficient" than a
48. Sullivan, supra note 35, at 553 n.78.
49. Id. at 555. Subsequent to the ratification of the thirteenth amendment, a
Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction was organized to monitor conditions
in the South. This Committee was a significant change in legislative procedure. Joint
committees made more efficient use of Congress' time, because "[t]hesejoint stand-
ing committees allowed concentration of information, expertness, and talent and
avoided duplication of effort or energy." MORE PERFECT UNION, supra note 33, at
183. See generally THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUC-
TION (reproduced in 62 COL. U. STUDIES (1914) (B. Kendrick ed.)).
50. J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
149 (1951).
51. Senator Trumbull stated:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the
insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in
nearly all the States they have discriminated against them. They deny them
certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them
the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the
existence of slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the [civil
rights bill] under consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to
carry into effect the constitutional amendment.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
52. Id.
53. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40, 93-95, 1152, 1861
(1865-66). One congressman read from letters received from citizens throughout the
southern states describing the deplorable conditions under which the former slaves
lived. Id. at 93-95.
1991]
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bill not founded upon the amendment.54 Another senator later
remarked:
It was the purpose of [the thirteenth amendment] to relieve those
who were slaves from all the oppressive incidents of slavery....
The amendment to the Constitution gave liberty to all; and in giv-
ing liberty it gave also a complete exemption from the tyrannical
acts, the tyrannical restrictions, and the tyrannical laws which be-
long to the condition of slavery, and which it is the object of [the
civil rights bill] forever to remove. 55
In support of such a broad interpretation of section 1981, Justice
Stewart noted in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,56 "that the bill would
indeed have so sweeping an effect was seen as its great virtue by its
friends and as its great danger by its enemies but was disputed by
none." 57 Furthermore, the opponents of the bill on occasion at-
tempted to minimize the racial animus of white Southerners but
never argued whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would prevent
such discrimination.58
The civil rights bill passed both the House of Representatives and
the Senate only to be vetoed by President Johnson on March 27,
1866.59 In the spring of that year, both the House6o and the Sen-
ate6 ' voted to override Johnson's veto and the bill became law pursu-
ant to Congress' authority under section two of the thirteenth
amendment.62
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The degree of emphasis placed today on the congressional debates
and reports surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1866 depends upon
the theory of statutory interpretation used by a court. Through the
54. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865). Senator Wilson of Massachu-
setts introduced a bill which provided for the eradication of "laws, statutes, acts, or-
dinances, rules and regulations" in any confederate state which created "any
inequality of civil rights and immunities" based on "color, race, or... a previous
condition . . . of slavery .... " Id. at 39.
55. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866).
56. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
57. Id. at 433. See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1866) (Sen.
Cowan of Pennsylvania was concerned about the scope of the Civil Rights Bill.); id. at
602 (Sen. Hendricks of Indiana raised concerns about the bill's impact on current
Indiana law.).
58. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 181 (1965).
59. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866). The President sent Con-
gress a message which explained, section by section, the reasons for his veto of the
Civil Rights Bill. While recognizing an obligation to provide civil rights protection to
freedmen, the President refused to sanction this legislation. Id. at 879-81.
60. Id. at 1861.
61. Id. at 1809.
62. Id. at 1861.
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years, several theories of statutory interpretation have been es-
poused. These theories can be placed into three broad categories:
the "intentionalist" approach;63 the "textual" approach;64 and, the
"dynamic" approach.65
A. Intentionalist Approach
Courts most often use intentionalism when interpreting statutes.66
Under this approach to statutory interpretation, the court examines
63. The intentionalist approach falls under a broader method of statutory inter-
pretation called "Originalism." This method interprets the statute in light of the
statute's original history and text rather than public policy or precedents. Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980) [hereinafter
Brest]. Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 21. Another term associated with this method
of interpretation is "archaeological." Under this method "the meaning of a statute is
set in stone on the date of its enactment, and it is the interpreter's task to uncover
and reconstruct that original meaning." Id.
64. The textualist approach is also included under Originalism but relies on stat-
utory language as the primary or exclusive source of the law. See Brest, supra note 63,
at 205.
65. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987)
[hereinafter Dynamic Statutory Interpretation]. Eskridge asserts that statutes should "be
interpreted 'dynamically,' that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal
context." Id. at 1479; see also Brest, supra note 63, at 205 ("Nonoriginalism" accords
the original text and history of a statute some weight but allows the interpretation to
change "in light of changing experiences and perceptions."); Aleinikoff, supra note
23, at 21 (Nauticalism views statutory interpretation as an on-going process in which
the judiciary plays a primary role in setting the statutory meaning based on the "mo-
res of today.").
66. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTrES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (4th ed.
1984).
For the interpretation of statutes, "intent of the legislature" is the criterion
that is most often recited .... The reason for this lies in an assumption that
an obligation to construe statutes so that they carry out the will, real or
attributed, of the lawmaking branch of the government is mandated by prin-
ciples of separation of powers.
Id at 20-21. See, e.g., United States v. Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1982)
(examining the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and
concluding that Congress intended burning newspapers to be within the meaning of
an "explosive" device); Mills v. Ozark Bd. of Educ., 376 So. 2d 747 (Ala. Civ. App.
1979) (examining the history behind Alabama's workers' compensation law and con-
cluding that the legislature intended for the term "school district" to include the
controlling school board); Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Maricopa County, 120 Ariz.
533, 587 P.2d 252 (1978) (concluding that the legislature intended an Arizona tax
statute to lessen the tax burden for all property owners); California Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 598 P.2d 836, 157 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1979) (con-
cluding that utility rebates from suppliers qualified as rate refunds under the Public
Utility Code based on the legislative history of the relevant statutes); Smith v. Cofer,
243 Ga. 531, 255 S.E.2d 49 (1979) (concluding that the Department of Natural Re-
sources was not required to open state rivers to shrimp fishermen based on an exami-
nation of legislative history); In re Hawaiian Tel. Co., 61 Haw. 572, 608 P.2d 383
(1980) (concluding that the state legislature intended that certain public service reve-
nue be excluded from state tax).
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the history preceding the bill's enactment to determine what legal
issues the legislature intended the statute to address.67 Proponents
claim an intentionalist approach is necessary because "words have
no 'plain meaning'; meaning depends on context and usage."68
Under this theory a statute's meaning is fixed on the date of the
statute's enactment. 69 If the answer to a particular issue is not evi-
dent within the statute, legislative materials must be examined to un-
derstand how Congress would have resolved the issue.70 If the
answer to a particular issue is evident within the statute, the statute's
legislative history may still be examined if the plain meaning of the
statute would produce an absurd or unreasonable result.7 1
The Supreme Court's decision in Holy Trinity Church v. United
States 2 illustrates how the Court uses legislative intent to avoid such
an absurd or unreasonable result. The Holy Trinity Church con-
tracted with an English clergyman to travel to New York and become
the rector and pastor of the church.73 The United States brought
suit claiming the contract was in violation of an 1885 statute which
prohibited " 'any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in
any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way
assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or
aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States ....' "7
The Court conceded that the church had violated the plain mean-
ing of the statute. 75 But a literal interpretation, the Court ruled,
would lead to an absurd result.76 The Court said:
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers .... [Firequently words...
are ... broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a con-
67. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1914)
(Statutes "should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagina-
tion of the purposes which lie behind them."). See generally Posner, Statutory Interpreta-
tion-in the Classroom and in the.Courtroom, 50 U. CnI. L. REV. 800 (1983) [hereinafter
Posner]; Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1479; Aleinikoff, supra note
23, at 20; Brest, supra note 63, at 204.
68. Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 23.
69. Id. at 23-24.
70. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 67, at 819-20; Horak, In the Name of Legislative
Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119, 121-25 (1931). Cf H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (tent. ed. 1958)
(Rather than stepping into the legislator's shoes, this approach merely states that
statutory interpretation is based on the general purpose of the statute back when it
was enacted.).
71. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892).
72. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
73. Id. at 458.
74. Id. (quoting Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 459.
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sideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from
giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to
believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act. 7 7
Upon examining the legislative history surrounding the statute, the
Court concluded that the intended prohibition sought by Congress
was the importation of cheap manual labor rather than clergy.78
Similarly, in 1979, the Supreme Court applied an intentionalist
approach in a civil rights case involving Title VII. In United Steelwork-
ers of America v. Weber, 79 the United Steelworkers Union of America
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Kaiser Alumi-
num and Chemical Corporation (Kaiser).80 The agreement included
an affirmative action plan which required that African-American em-
ployees comprise fifty percent of persons selected for Kaiser's craft
training program.8 1 Consequently, African-Americans were hired
into the program before white employees with greater seniority were
hired.82 One such white employee, Brian Weber, initiated a class ac-
tion. He alleged that the affirmative action plan discriminated
against him and his fellow white employees in violation of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.83
Specifically, Weber argued that sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII
prohibited employment discrimination based on race.8 4 Weber also
77. Id.
78. Id. at 463. The lower court did not agree with this interpretation. Citing
section 5 of the statute, the lower court asserted that clergymen are not exempt be-
cause they do not fall within the specifically enumerated exceptions to the statute.
The section five exemptions include professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers and
domestic servants. The lower court stressed that it is a "well-settled rule of statutory
interpretation" that a section which carves out exceptions to a statute is to be inter-
preted as providing the sole exceptions to the rule. Consequently, clergymen were
not exempt from the statute. United States v. Church of the Holy Trinity, 36 F. 303,
305 (S.D.N.Y. 1888).
79. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
80. Id. at 197-98. The plan was initiated to eliminate "conspicuous racial imbal-
ances" in the Kaiser craftwork forces. Id. at 198. "Black craft hiring goals were set
for each Kaiser plant equal to the percentage of blacks in the respective local labor
forces." Id. In order to meet these goals, training programs were established to
teach both African-American and white workers the necessary craftworker skills. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 199.
83. Id. at 199-200.
84. Id. Section 703(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982))
provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
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argued that, because the Supreme Court had previously held that
Title VII forbids discrimination against whites,85 the affirmative ac-
tion plan discriminated against Weber and his fellow white
employees.86
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, used Holy Trinity Church
to rebut Weber's literal interpretation of the statute.87 Brennan con-
cluded that a literal reading of the relevant sections produced a re-
sult that conflicted with the "spirit" of the statute:
The prohibition against racial discrimination in §§ 703(a) and (d)
of Title VII must therefore be read against the background of the
legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from which
the Act arose. Examination of those sources makes clear that an
interpretation of the sections that forbade all race-conscious affirm-
ative action would "bring about an end completely at variance with
the purpose of the statute" and must be rejected.88
Justice Brennan determined that the legislative intent of Title VII
was to elevate African-Americans to the same level of employment as
whites.89
In his dissent, ChiefJustice Burger criticized the majority for over-
stepping the proper boundaries of judicial interpretation.90 The
Chief Justice asserted that the majority's interpretation was "con-
trary to the explicit language of the statute and arrived at by means
wholly incompatible with long-established principles of separation of
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Section 703(d) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(d)) provides:
(d) ... It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs
to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program es-
tablished to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1982).
85. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979). In McDon-
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), three employees, two white
and one black, were charged with misappropriating company property. Only the
white employees, however, were discharged. Consequently, the white employees
sued the company under section 1981. The Court concluded that section 1981 ap-
plies to "'all persons' . . . including white persons." Id. at 287 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981) (original emphasis). The Court took a characteristically intentionalist ap-
proach to interpreting section 1981, relying heavily on the statute's legislative his-
tory. See id. at 287-96.
86. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 201-02 (quoting United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295,
315 (1953)) (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 202-03.
90. Id. at 216-17 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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A close analysis of both the majority and dissenting opinions
reveals the difficulty the Court had with using the intentionalist ap-
proach. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist recounted sev-
eral debates which indicated that Congress did not intend the statute
to create mandatory or voluntary quotas. 92 This conclusion is not as
clear as Justice Rehnquist asserts. Nowhere in the legislative history
cited by Justice Rehnquist does Congress explicitly state that the
statute prohibits mandatory or voluntary quotas.93
The majority encountered similar difficulty arguing in favor of
quotas. Justice Brennan ignored substantially all of the history noted
by the dissent, relying instead on the intent of Title VII espoused by
the House Judiciary Committee report: obtaining more jobs for
blacks.94 This interpretation, however, is in sharp contrast to an-
other purpose of the statute: creating a colorblind society.95 Justice
Brennan failed to reconcile these two conflicting purposes of Title
VII.
A better approach to interpreting Title VII would be to read the
statute within the context of contemporary societal and political sen-
timent toward racial equality, that is, around the time, of Weber. At
that point in time, "American society came to understand that the
invidious effects of discrimination might last long after the discrimi-
nation itself ceased and that more affirmative measures were needed
to afford any reasonable chance for a color-blind society in the fu-
ture." 96 Thus, an interpretation of Title VII in light of current socie-
tal beliefs provides a persuasive argument for mandatory quotas.
This interpretation is in accord with the dynamic approach to statu-
tory interpretation.97
Although the intentionalist approach is widely accepted and often
leads to a rational conclusion, the majority and dissenting opinions
in Weber illustrate that the intentionalist approach is not without pit-
falls. One pitfall is the "public choice theory." 98 This theory asserts
91. Id. at 216.
92. Id. at 231-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. See Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1490-91.
94. Id. at 1491 (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-
04 (1979)).
95. Id. at 1491.
96. Id. at 1492.
97. See infra notes 138-62 and accompanying text (defining and explaining the
dynamic approach).
98. See Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 28.
"Application of 'broad purposes' of legislation at the expense of specific
provisions ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon
to address and the dynamics of legislative action. Congress may be unani-
mous in its intent to stamp out some vague social or economic evil; however,
because its Members may differ sharply on the means for effectuating that
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that, because "legislation is the product of compromises among
groups .... attributing a purpose to a statute either may improperly
privilege the interests of one group over another (thereby undermin-
ing the bargain) or may impute a purpose where none (other than
the desire to reach agreement) existed."99 The theory also contends
that not all statutes are created for reasonable purposes.OO There-
fore, a court, by examining the history of a statute, may inadvertently
be asserting that court's own policy rather than that of the
legislature.101
Another pitfall involves the freedom of judicial interpretation af-
forded the courts under an intentionalist approach. The holding in
Holy Trinity Church demonstrates that a court can ignore the language
of a statute and assert its own judicial policy based on its interpreta-
tion of the legislature's intent. 02 As Chief Justice Burger noted in
Weber, however, this approach raises separation of powers issues.103
Intentionalism allows a court to determine the policy or purpose of a
statute on behalf of the legislature when the statute itself is unclear
or renders an outcome contrary to public policy.104 As Justice Rehn-
quist pointed out in Weber, the majority failed to adhere "to the oft-
stated principle that our duty is to construe rather than rewrite
history." 105
Another pitfall may be characterized as "legislative laziness." Leg-
islators may spend less time, or use less care in drafting statutes, un-
derstanding that the courts will clarify any ambiguities.106
Intentionalism may also encourage legislative reports and floor de-
bates geared toward future interpretation of the statute rather than
toward drafting the statute itself.107
These pitfalls act to restrain the use of intentionalism to limited
intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect hard-fought com-
promises. Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at the expense of
the terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compro-
mise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent."
Id. at 28 n.42 (quoting Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
373-74 (1986)).
99. Id. at 28.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (refusing to
apply a federal statute to an action "which the whole history and life of the country
affirm could not have been intentionally legislated against").
103. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Burger,
CJ., dissenting) ("Court's judgment ... arrived at by means wholly incompatible
with long-established principle of separation of powers").
104. See generally S. MERMIN, supra note 23, at 251.
105. Weber, 443 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 29.
107. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 698-752 (1988).
[Vol. 17
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 18
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/18
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
situations. As illustrated by Holy Trinity Church, intentionalism works
best when a literal interpretation renders an absurd result in light of
a statute's legislative history.108 The Weber case, however, illustrates
that intentionalism loses much of its persuasive power if the legisla-
tive history is vague or fraught with contradictions.
B. Textual Approach
Another form of statutory interpretation, currently experiencing a
resurgence' 09 in application through use by some justices on the
Supreme Court, is often referred to as the "textual approach."
Under this approach, the legislative history surrounding a statute is
deemed irrelevant.10o Justice Holmes, an advocate of textualism,
noted: "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means.""' Supporters of this view" 2 contend that
only the language enumerated in the statute is law: "Unenacted in-
tentions, no matter how resolutely stated in legislative materials, can-
not be authoritative because they have not been adopted according
to constitutionally prescribed procedures."113 The "plain meaning"
108. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
109. See infra note 112.
110. See supra note 23.
111. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
112. The textual approach has been gaining support in recent years. One reason
courts are reluctant to interpret statutes broadly is that such an interpretation
amounts to "rewriting rules" created by a separate branch of government. See Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
See also R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 9-10
(1975) (Giving weight to legislative history in the process of interpreting statutes
circumvents the constitutional requirement of executive participation in lawmaking.);
Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 442-43 (1988)
(discussing legislators' and judges' reaction to justice Scalia's "extreme approach" of
disregarding legislative history); Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History,
1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375 (1987) ("[Dlangers inherent in the use of legislative history
generally outweigh the arguable advantages resulting from its use."). But see Jones,
The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH.
U.L.Q 2, 25 (1939) (Rule "would have the effect ... of withdrawing from the consid-
eration of judges the facts which constitute the necessary basis of effective statutory
interpretation.") [hereinafter Jones]; Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative
History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM.
U.L. REV. 277, 303 (1990) (disfavoring textual approach because "judicious resort to
legislative history is an indispensable part" of judicial interpretation).
Two other prominent "plain meaning" advocates are Justice Scalia and Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Where the language ... is
clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent."); Easter-
brook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59,
60 (1988) ("[Tlhe words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the
'law.' ").
113. Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 23.
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of the statute prevails under this approach. 14 Proponents of this
textual approach argue that the plain meaning serves as a reasonable
approximation of actual legislative intent.'15
In 1917, the Supreme Court adopted the textual approach in Cami-
netti v. United States.' 16 Caminetti was charged with transporting a
woman from Sacramento, California to Reno, Nevada where she was
to "become his mistress and concubine." 17 The Court found Cami-
netti's actions to be in direct violation of the White Slave Traffic Act
of 1910,118 which prohibited the interstate transportation of "any
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for
any other immoral purpose .... 1"19
The Court's holding was based on the literal meaning of the White
Slave Traffic Act rather than an examination of extrinsic legislative
intent.120 The Court noted that "[s]tatutory words are uniformly
presumed.., to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with
the meaning commonly attributed to them."' 2' Applying this rule,
the Court stated that to construe the transportation of a woman for
the purpose of making her a "mistress or concubine" as anything
114. The legislative purpose of a statute is expressed within the words of the stat-
ute. In order to understand this purpose, the words are assigned their ordinary
meaning. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986). This view presumes that
the legislative intent is to have statutes interpreted in accordance with the "plain
meaning" of their words. See Jones, supra note 112, at 6.
115. Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 23. See generally Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
116. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
117. Id. at 482-83.
118. Id. at 486.
119. Id. at 488 n. 1. At the time of Caminetti, the then-entitled White Slave Traffic
Act specifically provided:
That any person who shall knowingly transport ... in interstate or foreign
commerce... any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauch-
ery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to
induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to
give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice
... shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment of not more than five years, or both ....
White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1988)).
120. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 490. In support of the textual approach, the Court
noted:
[I]t has been so often affirmed as to become a recognized rule, when words
are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the legisla-
tive intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations
drawn from titles or designating names or reports accompanying their intro-
duction, or from any extraneous source. In other words, the language being
plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is
the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.
Id.
121. Id. at 485-86.
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other than immoral within the meaning of the statute "would shock
the common understanding of what constitutes an immoral purpose
when those terms are applied, as here, to sexual relations."122 Thus,
Caminetti illustrates the conditions under which the textual approach
works best: when the statute at issue is clearly written and a literal
interpretation fits in with current societal perceptions regarding the
evils sought to be eliminated by the statute.
Similarly, the textual approach may apply when the literal meaning
of a statute is in concert with its legislative history. In INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca,123 Justice Scalia, a proponent of textualism,124 rejected the
majority's adherence to an intentionalist approach, suggesting that a
textual approach would have rendered the same outcome.' 25 The
case involved a Nicaraguan immigrant who was living illegally in the
United States.l26 In an attempt to avoid deportation, Cardoza-Fon-
seca claimed she was a refugee pursuant to section 208(a) of the
1980 Refugee Act.' 27 The Refugee Act provided in part that the At-
torney General may grant asylum to an alien who is unwilling to re-
turn to her country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion ... ."128
The immigration judge denied Cardoza-Fonseca asylum.129 The
judge applied an objective standard requiring Cardoza-Fonseca to
show a "clear probability of persecution" upon returning to Nicara-
gua in order to fit within section 243(h).130 Thejudge held that Car-
doza-Fonseca had not met that standard.131 The Supreme Court
rejected this standard and applied a subjective one which required
that Cardoza-Fonseca prove only a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion"1s2 upon returning to her country.ss The majority based its
conclusion on a literal reading of the statute supported by an "ex-
122. Id. at 486.
123. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-45 (1988) (ScaliaJ., con-
curring); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 6-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 424.
127. Id.
128. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) (1988).
129. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 425.
130. Id. The precise language of section 243(h) provides: "The Attorney General
shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
131. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 425,
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
133. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428-42.
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haustive investigation of the legislative history." 3 4
Justice Scalia objected to this lengthy investigation, noting that
"j]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' inten-
tions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to
replace it with an unenacted legislative intent."' 3 5 This analysis sug-
gests that because the word "fear" connotes the subjective feelings
of the one unwilling to leave the country, a literal interpretation of
the statute reveals that a subjective standard must apply to section
208(a).
Although Cardoza-Fonseca demonstrates when the textual approach
is clearly applicable, circumstances may arise which make application
of this approach difficult. In Caminetti, the Court noted the plain lan-
guage controls unless "absurd or wholly impracticable conse-
quences" would result.13 6 When does a literal interpretation of a
statute result in an "absurd or wholly impracticable" result? The
Court addressed this question in Holy Trinity Church and concluded
that a literal interpretation may be too broad, creating a result which
is unreasonable and contrary to the legislature's original intent.'3 7
C. Dynamic Approach
The third approach to statutory interpretation is not bound by the
meaningis8 or purpose 3 9 of the statute as fixed on the date of enact-
ment. Instead, the dynamic approach is similar to the common law
in application.140 Proponents believe that statutes "should-like the
Constitution and the common law-be interpreted 'dynamically,'
that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal con-
text." 4 ' The "best" interpretation is that which is most in harmony
"with our current 'web of beliefs' and policies surrounding the stat-
ute."' 142 The dynamic approach is used in two situations: (1) when
134. Id. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 452-53.
136. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
137. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
138. The concept of interpreting a statute based on that statute's meaning is asso-
ciated with textualism. See supra note 23.
139. An interpretation of a statute based on that statute's purpose, as seen in light
of the relevant legislative history, is an approach illustrative of intentionalism. See
supra note 63.
140. "[S]tatutes should be interpreted similarly to the common law, with the judi-
cial interpreter determining in each case what is the 'best' application of the statute in
light of current circumstances." Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1479
n.l (citing R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 313-54 (1986)).
141. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1479.
142. Id. at 1483. Cf Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1617 (1987) (In the context of the first amendment analysis,
.,confining reason to logical deduction from set premises, foundationalism curtails
the use of our most powerful problem-solving abilities.").
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the text of the statute and its legislative history are ambiguous; or,
(2) when a literal interpretation differs from the "spirit" of the stat-
ute and is inconsistent with current societal beliefs.'4 3
Justice Stevens, a proponent of the dynamic approach,t44 applied
that approach in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.' 45 In 1978, the
Santa Clara County Transit District Board of Supervisors adopted an
affirmative action plan (Plan) for the county transportation agency
(Agency).146 The purpose of the Plan was to increase female em-
ployment in jobs where women were significantly under-repre-
sented.t47 Consequently, the Plan allowed the Agency to consider
gender when determining an applicant's qualifications for
promotion. 148
In accordance with the Plan, the Agency promoted a female em-
ployee rather than a male applicant named Paul Johnson.149 John-
son sued the Agency alleging that he had been denied the promotion
based on his gender, in violation of Title VII.150 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, relied on Weber to uphold the Plan.' 5 ' As in
Weber, Justice Brennan here noted that "an employer seeking to jus-
tify the adoption of a plan.., need point only to a 'conspicuous...
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.' "152 Although
the Weber decision only examined the legislative history of Title VII
as that history related to African-Americans, Justice Brennan, under
the guise of an intentionalist approach, nevertheless applied the
143. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1481-84.
144. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 219-22 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642-47 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 189-92 (1976) (Stevens,J., concurring). See also Popkin, A Common Law
Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1087, 1137
(1989) ("[Justice Stevens] adopts an approach to statutory interpretation that defers
to legislative language, yet also shows concern for case-by-case adjudication and indi-
vidual dignity.").
145. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
146. Id. at 620. The county adopted the affirmative action plan because "'mere
prohibition of discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects of past
practices and to permit attainment of an equitable representation of minorities, wo-
men and handicapped persons.' " Id. (quoting application to petition for certiorari).
147. Id. at 620-21. While 36.4% of the county's labor force was female, only
22.4% of the agency's employees were women. Id. at 621.
148. Id. at 620-21.
149. Id. at 624-25.
150. Id. at 625.
151. Id. at 627. The Court noted that the Weber decision "was grounded in the
recognition that voluntary employer action can play a crucial role in furthering Title
VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in the workplace, and that
Title VII should not be read to thwart such efforts." Id. at 630 (citation and footnote
omitted).
152. Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979)).
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Weber rationale in Johnson.153
Justice Brennan would have done better to discard the intentional
approach in light of the peculiar situation in Johnson, and align him-
self with Justice Stevens' approach to interpreting Title VII. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens implied that the Court should no
longer be constrained by legislative history in interpreting Title
VII.'54 Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he logic of antidiscrimination
legislation requires that judicial constructions of Title VII leave
'breathing room' for employer initiatives to benefit members of mi-
nority groups." 55 From this,Justice Stevens could conclude that Ti-
tle VII would also support gender-based preferential hiring plans,t56
despite the clear indication in Weber that Title VII was meant to
target racial discrimination.t57
Both Weber and Johnson suggest the dynamic approach: "[W]hen
societal conditions change in ways not anticipated by Congress and,
especially, when the legal and constitutional context of the statute
decisively shifts as well, this current perspective should, and will, af-
fect the statute's interpretation, notwithstanding contrary inferences
from the historical evidence."t58 Thus, a dynamic approach will
work best when old and vaguely written statutes must be applied to
circumstances never contemplated by Congress. In these circum-
stances, some deference should be given to current societal beliefs
and perspectives on the issue, provided these considerations are
consistent with the statute's legislative intent.
Some critics claim that under the dynamic approach the judiciary is
conferring upon itself a power which was not delegated to it under
the Constitution. Specifically, the argument is that "the Constitu-
tion's separation of powers gives all lawmaking power to Congress
and none to the federal courts and that intentionalism is the only
mode of statutory interpretation that is consonant with this constitu-
tional division of functions."t59
Other critics take a less severe position on "judicial lawmaking."
153. Id. at 627-28.
154. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 645.
156. Justice Stevens concluded that Title VII was not intended to "absolutely pro-
hibit preferential hiring in favor of minorities; it was merely intended to protect his-
torically disadvantaged groups against discrimination and not to hamper managerial
efforts to benefit members of disadvantaged groups that are consistent with that par-
amount purpose." Id. at 646. Because of his allowance for "breathing room" in the
interpretation of Title VII, Justice Stevens can easily segue from a view of the statute
as protecting "minorities," to one where Title VII instead protects "disadvantaged
groups.
157. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979).
158. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1494.
159. Id. at 1498-99.
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They claim that a court's lawmaking authority is limited by legislative
approval. This view necessarily restricts a court's statutory interpre-
tation to the textual or intentionalist approach.60
These criticisms fail to recognize the cost involved, both in time
and money, for Congress to amend statutes to cover every new situa-
tion not contemplated by the drafters.161 Furthermore, legislative
inaction in cases like Weber and Johnson demonstrates congressional
approval of the dynamic approach to statutory interpretation.162
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTs ACT OF 1866
From the inception of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Act), the
Supreme Court has applied all three forms of statutory interpreta-
tion to some degree. Early civil rights cases, such as Hodges v. United
States, 163 illustrate a restricted and literal interpretation of the Act.
In Hodges, a group of white citizens terrorized African-Americans
to prevent them from working in a sawmill.' 64 An action was
brought for conspiracy to prevent African-Americans from entering
into contracts for employment. 165 The Hodges Court noted that "one
of the disabilities of slavery, one of the indicia of its existence, was a
lack of power to make or perform contracts .. ... "66 The Court,
however, narrowly interpreted the term "slavery"16 7 and inferred
160. Id. at 1498-1503.
161. See Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423,
458-60 (1988). In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court, a number of members of
Congress noted an even greater cost, arguing:
Any congressional effort to change a decision of this Court [in Runyon v.
McCraty] could prove divisive and time consuming, could well be delayed by
disagreement over collateral issues, and could confront grave difficulties in
addressing the nuances that have arisen from case-by-case elaboration of the
statute. But with regard to one of the core civil rights statutes, the costs are
far greater. To require the Congress to revisit this issue could jeopardize
the closure and repose that we have obtained as a Nation on the issue of
racial discrimination.
Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioner at 28, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-107) (submitted by 66 Members of the United States Senate
and 118 Members of the United States House of Representatives).
162. See Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioner at 28, Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-107). See generally Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
163. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id. at 2 (a right secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1988)).
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id. at 18. The Court stated that "no mere personal assault or trespass or
appropriation operates to reduce the individual to a condition of slavery." Id. The
Court then quoted from the respondent's brief which conceded that the United
States Constitution does not secure any citizen " 'the right to work at a given occupa-
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that an African-American must actually be enslaved before the thir-
teenth amendment or any related legislative act would apply.' 68
The Hodges Court adopted a textual approach. No reference was
made to legislative history. Rather, the Court focused upon the
meaning of the term "slavery."169 At one point in the opinion, the
Court cited the Webster Dictionary definition of slavery as "'the
state of entire subjection of one person to the will of another.' "170
The plain meaning of slavery operated to exclude the plaintiffs from
protection under the Act 7 as they had the freedom to seek employ-
ment elsewhere.
Hodges represented the apex ofjudicial restraint on statutory inter-
pretation of the Act.172 The effects of such a narrow construction of
section 1981 were felt for decades after the decision. Sixty-two years
later, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,173 the Supreme Court reversed
Hodges and began to interpret section 1981 broadly,174 an approach
more consistent with the congressional determination to eradicate
racial animus.'75 In Jones, a white homeowner refused to sell his
house to an African-American couple solely because of their race. ' 76
The couple sued the homeowner, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982177 which provides: "All citizens of the United States shall
tion or particular calling free from injury, oppression, or interference by individual
citizens.'" Id.
168. SeeJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968). The Court
inJones referred to the narrow interpretation of the term "slavery" in Hodges, which
"asserted that only conduct which actually enslaves someone can be subjected to
punishment under legislation enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." Id. at
442 n.78. TheJones Court then expressly overruled Hodges, noting: "The conclusion
of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congressional power under the
Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with the position taken by every member of
this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with the history and purpose of
the Amendment itself." Id. at 442-43 n.78.
169. After quoting the thirteenth amendment, the Court stated: "The meaning of
[the thirteenth amendment] is as clear as language can make it. The things de-
nounced are slavery and involuntary servitude ...." Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1, 16 (1906).
170. Id. at 17.
171. The Court stressed that, "[w]hile the inciting cause of the Amendment was
the emancipation of the colored race, . . . [the amendment] is not an attempt to
commit that race to the care of the Nation." Id. at 16.
172. Comment, Developments in the Law--Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
29, 63-64 (1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
173. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
174. See supra note 168. See also Refsin, The Lost Clauses of Section 1981: A Source of
Greater Protection After Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1220-
21 (1990) (The Jones decision "revitalized the 1866 Act.").
175. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
176. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 412. The couple sought injunctive and other relief pro-
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have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property."178 In Jones, the Court directly ad-
dressed for the first time whether section 1982 applied to private acts
of discrimination.179
The Court began its analysis with section two of the thirteenth
amendment, which empowers Congress to enforce section one with
appropriate legislation.180 While the enactment of section 1982 was
within the powers granted by the thirteenth amendment, this was not
determinative of the issue. The Court therefore examined the legis-
lative history of the Act.181 Based on an exhaustive analysis of Sen-
ate debates and reports, the majority concluded: " 'We are not at
liberty to seek ingenious analytical instruments' to carve from § 1982
an exception for private conduct-even though its application to
such conduct in the present context is without established prece-
dent. . . . 'The fact that the statute lay partially dormant for many
years cannot be held to diminish its force today.' "182 The majority
interpreted the legislative purpose of the Act to prohibit private acts
of discrimination which prevent African-Americans from purchasing
real estate.18 3
The dissent in Jones used the same approach in interpreting section
1982 but came to the opposite conclusion.18 4 Justice Harlan con-
cluded that the language of the statute was unclear.185 Specifically,
Justice Harlan asserted that the term "right" might refer to either
the "right to equal status under the law, in which case the statute
operates only against state-sanctioned discrimination, or it may be an
'absolute' right enforceable against private individuals."186 Conse-
quently, the dissent performed its own lengthy analysis of pertinent
legislative materials surrounding the Act.187 A strong case was
presented which indicated that the Act was intended only to prevent
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) (recodifying section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866).
179. Jones, 392 U.S. at 419-20 (The Court cited to dictum in Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24 (1948), which indicated section 1982 applied only to governmental action.).
180. Id. at 437-38.
181. See id. at 439-43.
182. Id. at 437 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) and the
Attorney General of the United States) (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 443 (stating Congress is empowered under the thirteenth amendment
to ensure African-Americans equal choice in housing).
184. Id. at 450 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 452-53 (Unlike the majority, Justice Harlan did not feel that section
1982 was plain and unambiguous.).
186. Id. at 453. Justice Harlan stated that the words of section 1982 indicated that
"right" refers to the right to equal status under the law. Id.
187. See id. at 455-73.
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discrimination by the state.' 88
Jones illustrates the Court's intention to defer to legislative history
when the language of a statute is unclear. 18 9 Although the precedent
set by Jones was neither rooted in clear legislative intent nor unam-
biguous statutory language, the decision marked the beginning of a
new era in civil rights litigation based on private acts of discrimina-
tion.190 The Supreme Court later extended this interpretation to
section 1981 and private acts of employment discrimination.191
The Jones decision was challenged eight years later in Runyon v.
McCrary.192 In Runyon, several African-American couples were pre-
vented from enrolling their children in private schools which ac-
cepted only "caucasian" students.193 The schools asserted a
constitutional right to deny African-American applicants admission
based on claims of freedom of association and right of privacy.1 94
Citing the precedent established in Jones, the Runyon Court held that
section 1981 was applicable to private acts of discrimination. 195 Sim-
ilar to the dissent in Jones, the dissent in Runyon reiterated that the
legislative history of section 1981 did not indicate an intent to cover
private acts, such as the right to make private contracts.' 96
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens took a strikingly differ-
ent approach to interpreting section 1981. He concluded:
188. Id.
189. TheJones decision best illustrates the intentionalist approach to interpreting
the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Both the majority and dissent performed an exhaustive
inquiry into the origins of the Act. TheJnes decision also illustrates the drawback of
this approach. Specifically, theJones Court revealed the ambiguity surrounding the
Reconstruction Congress' intended purpose of the Act. See generally Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
190. See Developments in the Law, supra note 172, at 66-69.
191. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Johnson, a
group of African-American railway employees claimed their employer discriminated
against them with respect to seniority rules and job assignments. Id. at 455. The
African-American employees sued under section 1981 and Title VII. Id. at 456. The
Court allowed recovery under Title VII but not section 1981, as the statute of limita-
tions had run. Id. at 462-63. The Court stated, however, that "it is well settled...
that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on
the basis of race." Id. at 459-60.
192. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
193. Id. at 165.
194. Id. at 166-70, 175 (The Court recognized that the first amendment fosters the
development of public and private points of view.).
195. Id. at 173-75. The interpretation of section 1981 is reaffirmed in Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) and in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). Id. at 175 n.10.
196. See id. at 194 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded: "[Tihe
legislative history of § 1981 unequivocally confirms that Congress' purpose in enact-
ing that statute was solely to grant to all persons equal capacity to contract as is
enjoyed by whites and included no purpose to prevent private refusals to contract,
however motivated." Id. at 205.
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[E]ven if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the Re-
construction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense
of justice today.
The policy of the Nation as formulated by the Congress in recent
years has moved constantly in the direction of eliminating racial
segregation in all sectors of society. This Court has given a sympa-
thetic and liberal construction to such legislation. For the Court
now to overruleJones would be a significant step backwards. 19 7
Disregarding the unclear intent of Congress, Justice Stevens adopted
the dynamic approach in interpreting section 1981.198 This ap-
proach to interpreting section 1981 is most persuasive, in light of the
goals of the statute. Although Congress did not specifically address
the issue of private discrimination under the Act, the holding in Run-
yon is in accord with the Reconstruction Congress' goals of eradicat-
ing racial discrimination. Furthermore, these goals remain the goals
of Congress today.199
IV. PATTERSON V. McLEAN CREDIT UNION
The Court's liberal interpretation of section 1981 came to an end
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.200 Brenda Patterson brought an
action against her employer, McLean Credit Union, for racial harass-
ment20 1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.202 The district court granted a di-
197. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
198. Justice Stevens stated that overrulingJones "would be ... contrary to my
understanding of the mores of today .. ." Id. at 191-92. The civil rights legislation
in place at that time included:
[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, as added and as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1970
ed. and Supp. IV); the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as added and
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-4; the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Ti-
tles VIII, IX, 82 Stat. 81, 89, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 ed.
and Supp. IV).
Id. at 191 n.4.
199. See generally Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioner, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). During the congressional debates over the Civil
Rights Bill of 1990, Rep. Washington remarked:
Now is the time to overcome, forever, the dark days of the period of our
history which can only be looked upon with shame. Now is the time to over-
come the effects of 58 years of legal discrimination in this country. Now is
the time to overcome 94 years of the vestiges of Dred Scott, Slaughter
House, and Civil Rights cases and Plessy versus Ferguson. Now is the time
for a new order in our country.
136 CONG. REc. H9978, H9980 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Washington).
200. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
201. The court of appeals summarized Patterson's testimony about the racial har-
assment she was subject to as follows:
"[that her supervisor] periodically stared at her for several minutes at a
time; that he gave her too many tasks, causing her to complain that she was
under too much pressure; that among the tasks given her were sweeping
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rected verdict in favor of McLean Credit Union. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.203 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a cause of ac-
tion for postcontract formation racial discrimination was actionable
under section 1981.204
In addressing this issue, the Court, sua sponte, ordered the parties
to argue the additional issue of whether section 1981 covers private
conduct.205 The Court upheld the Runyon decision, concluding that
section 1981 did in fact extend to private contracts. 20 6 Writing for
the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that Runyon had not been under-
mined by changes in the law207 or by changes in society's commit-
ment to eliminating discrimination.208 Furthermore, the Court
found no special justification for deviating from the doctrine of stare
deCiS .209
Nevertheless, the Patterson majority determined that a cause of ac-
and dusting, jobs not given to white employees. On one occasion [her su-
pervisor] told [her] that blacks are known to work slower than whites. [Her
supervisor] also criticized her in staff meetings while not similarly criticizing
white employees."
Id. at 178 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (1986)).
202. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 169. In her original pleading, Patterson also asserted a
claim for failure to promote and for wrongful discharge in addition to a pendent state
claim for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress. The district court
submitted the promotion and discharge claims to a jury which found for McLean
Credit Union. In addition, the court granted a directed verdict in favor of McLean
Credit Union on the emotional distress claim. Id. at 170; see also Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (1986).
203. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (1986).
204. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 170. Additionally, the Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding Patterson's
promotion claim, and held that the lower court did so err. Id. at 170-71. The Court
also stated that an employee may present various types of evidence to prove that an
employer's proffered reasons for termination are pretextual. Id. at 187-88.
205. Id. at 170-71. Several legal scholars have theorized on the impact that re-
stricting section 1981 from covering private conduct would have on statutory inter-
pretation and the scope of the statute. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 23; Eisenberg &
Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596 (1988) (regarding the
"quantitative importance" of section 1981 litigation); Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 65; Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1988) (discussing the issues raised in Patterson and Runyon); Maltz,
Legislative Inaction and the Patterson Case, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 858 (1989) (symposium on
Patterson discussing whether Runyon should be overruled or modified).
206. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171.
207. Id. at 173.
208. Id. at 174-75 (citing BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his.., color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved.")).
209. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171-77.
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tion for racial harassment during employment was not cognizable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.210 The majority based this conclusion on a
literal reading of section 1981.211 No substantive attention was
given to the legislative history surrounding the statute.2 12 As in
Caminetti,213 the majority looked first at the ordinary meaning of the
statute to be construed, and concluded that the phrase "right... to
make ... contracts" meant only the creation or formation of a con-
tract.214 Therefore, the Court determined in turn that the phrase
could not apply to postcontract formation situations.215 The major-
ity went on to define the words "enforce contracts" as embracing the
protection of a legal process and the right of access to legal pro-
cess. 216 To enforce a contract is to have the right to use the legal
system to adjudicate one's right to make or enter into a nondiscrimi-
natory contract. 21 7
As did the dissent in Jones, the Patterson dissent adopted the inten-
tionalist approach to statutory interpretation.21 8 Justice Brennan, in
his dissenting opinion noted: "The legislative history of section 1981
•.. makes clear that we must not take an overly narrow view of what
it means to have the 'same right ... to make and enforce contracts' as
white citizens."219 Justice Brennan enumerated conditions under
which African-Americans were employed22o at the time the Act was
passed, and concluded that "such 'acts of persecution' against em-
ployed freedmen, were one of the 39th Congress' concerns in enact-
ing the [1866) Civil Rights Act . . ."221 Justice Brennan asserted
210. Id. at 175-81 (a 5-4 decision). The Court stated that "section 1981 cannot be
construed as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of contract
relations, for it expressly prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforce-
ment of contracts." Id. at 176.
211. The majority noted: "By its plain terms, the relevant provision in § 1981 pro-
tects two rights: 'the same right... to make... contracts' and 'the same right ... to
... enforce contracts.' " Id.
212. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that the majority arrived at its conclusion
"by conducting an ahistorical analysis that ignores the circumstances and legislative
history of § 1981." Id. at 205.
213. See discussion of Caminetti, supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
214. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176.
215. Id. at 175-78.
216. Id. at 178. The right to enforce contracts does not, however, extend beyond
an employer's conduct that impedes an employee's ability to legally enforce his or
her contract rights. Id.
217. Id.
218. Justice Brennan engaged in a lengthy analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
See id. at 189-213 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 206.
220. The use of the whip as an incentive to work harder is an example of such
working conditions. Id.
221. d. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Congress wanted to grant the freed-
men the same rights as white citizens to make and enforce contracts. Id.
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that the same legislative history was used to support the holding in
Runyon,222 a decision upheld by the Court in Patterson.2 23
As in Runyon, Justice Stevens took a dynamic approach in inter-
preting section 1981. In reference to Runyon, he stated:
[I]n the name of logic and coherence, the Court today adds a
course of bricks dramatically askew from 'the secure foundation of
the courses laid by others,' replacing a sense of rational direction
and purpose in the law with an aimless confinement to a narrow
construction of what it means to 'make' a contract.224
Similar to his opinion in Johnson,225 Justice Stevens argued that the
legislative history did not support the Court's interpretation of sec-
tion 1981.226 As in Runyon, he argued for a dynamic interpretation,
an interpretation which "surely accords with the prevailing sense of
justice today."22
7
V. TOWARD A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO INTERPRETING SECTION 1981
The decision in Patterson illustrates the confusion that surrounds
questions of section 1981's purpose. Advocates of the textual ap-
proach in Patterson successfully demonstrated that the plain meaning
of section 1981 does not encompass postcontract acts of racial dis-
crimination.228 Similar to Justice Scalia's opinion in INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca,229 the Patterson majority concluded that the Court was not at
liberty to replace the unambiguous language of section 1981 with
unenacted legislative intent.230
The majority was at ease with a "plain meaning" interpretation of
section 1981.231 Unfortunately, a disturbing question remains unan-
222. Id. Congress wanted to protect the freedmen in the employment context
from discriminatory discharge decisions, refusals to contract for their labor, and un-
fair working conditions. Id.
223. Id. at 172.
224. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
226. Justice Stevens appeared to be aware of section 1981's ambiguous history
and therefore excluded that history from his analysis in Patterson. Furthermore, Jus-
tice Stevens apparently believed that the public sentiment toward eradication of ra-
cial discrimination, combined with judicial precedents, precluded a literal reading of
section 1981. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221-22.
227. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
228. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175-81.
229. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
230. The majority stressed the plain meaning of section 1981, noting that "the
right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to
conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established .... Patter-
son, 491 U.S. at 177. Therefore, it logically follows that the majority considered the
literal meaning of section 1981 to be so clear as to bar any analysis of its legislative
history.
231. See supra note 114.
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swered. Like Holy Trinity Church,232 McLean Credit Union may not
have violated the literal meaning of section 1981, but did it violate
the "spirit" of the statute?23 3 The legislative history of the Act must
be unearthed to answer this question.234 The Patterson dissent ex-
plored the legislative history and discovered that the Reconstruction
Congress intended that postcontract racial discrimination be prohib-
ited under the Act.235 As in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,236
the Patterson dissent asserted that a literal interpretation is too limit-
ing and in contravention of section 1981's legislative history.237
The interpretation endorsed in the Patterson dissent appears rea-
sonable in light of the legislative history.238 TheJones dissent raises a
doubt, however, as to the credibility of the legislative materials pre-
ceding the enactment of the Act. 23 9 Justice Stevens has also noted
that recent Supreme Court decisions are no longer wholly supported
by section 1981's legislative history.240 The result is an unstable
foundation for constructing a statutory interpretation at variance
with the statute's literal meaning.241 Patterson illustrates the need for
232. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
233. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens answered this question in the af-
firmative. Criticizing the majority's narrow interpretation of the term "contract,"
Justice Stevens noted:
A contract is not just a piece of paper. Just as a single word is the skin of a
living thought, so is a contract evidence of a vital, ongoing relationship be-
tween human beings. An at-will employee.., is not merely performing an
existing contract; she is constantly remaking that contract. Whenever signif-
icant new duties are assigned to the employee.., the contract is amended
and a new contract is made.
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221.
234. One critic of intentionalism referred to it as an archaeological approach
which requires that "a judge [uncover] and [describe] an already fixed past. To be
sure, sophisticated archeology is creative and challenging. It must reconstruct a cul-
ture from half-buried foundations and some scattered pots. But the archeologist, at
least in theory, recreates the past culture as it was without introducing anachronistic
artifacts." Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 22 (citation omitted).
235. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 205-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
236. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
237. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 250-11, 208 n.12. Justice Brennan asserts that under
the language of section 1981, harassment is actionable if the harassment demon-
strates that the employer imposed discriminatory terms and has not allowed African-
Americans to contract on an equal basis. Id.
238. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 455-73 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Sen. Trumbull's criticism of Sen. Wilson's proposed civil
rights bill and the freedmen's bill generally).
239. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
241. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. illustrated the uncertainty of this foundation. The
debates surrounding the enactment of the 1866 Civil Rights Act are so abundant and
varied in their themes that an argument for or against the prohibition of private dis-
crimination under the Act could easily be made. See generally Jones v. Alfred H.
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the judiciary to identify when the various forms of statutory interpre-
tation are applicable.
A. A Case for the Textual Approach
Justice Scalia's opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca illustrates a case in favor
of the textual approach. As in Patterson, the language of the statute at
issue was clear and easily interpreted.242 The INS's interpretation
was not, however, at variance with the legislative intent as enumer-
ated by the Cardoza-Fonseca majority.243 Furthermore, the statute in
Cardoza-Fonseca was specific and consonant with its legislative his-
tory. 2 4 4 Part II of this article suggests that this is not the case with
section 1981. TheJones dissent may disagree.245
Unlike Caminetti v. United States,246 to construe section 1981 as ap-
plying only to contract formation discrimination would not "shock
the common understanding"247 of what it means to make a contract.
This might not, however, be the only rational interpretation of sec-
tion 1981. The legislative history as summarized in Part II of this
article demonstrates that the authors of the Act envisioned a statute
"much more sweeping" in its application than it is today.248
Consequently, the textual approach works best when the statute is
clearly and specifically written and consonant with its legislative
past.2 49 Under these circumstances the test espoused in Holy Trinity
Church v. United States25o is met. Specifically, a literal reading of the
statute will not produce an absurd or wholly impracticable result.251
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that section 1982 bars all public and private
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property).
242. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
243. Id. at 449.
244. Id. at 452-53. Justice Scalia asserts that the plain meaning of "well-founded
fear" and the Act itself demonstrate that the "well-founded fear" standard and the
"clear probability" standard are not equivalent. Id.
245. See generally Jones, 392 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan sug-
gested that the "right" referred to in section 1982 is either a right to equal status
under the law and thus operates only against state-sanctioned discrimination, or it is
an "absolute" right enforceable against private persons. Justice Harlan chose the
first interpretation. Id. at 453.
246. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
247. Id. at 486. Here the Court determined that the White Slave Traffic Act ap-
plied to all cases in which a woman or girl was transported in interstate commerce for
prostitution or any other immoral purpose. See discussion of Caminetti, supra notes
116-22 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
249. William N. Eskridge, Jr. proposed a similar model for statutory interpreta-
tion, noting that the textual approach works best with recent text which specifically
addresses the issue. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1497.
250. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
251. See id. at 459.
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B. A Case for the Intentionalist Approach
As Holy Trinity Church illustrates, the intentionalist approach ap-
pears useful when a literal reading of a statute creates unreasonable
results. 252 Applying the Holy Trinity Church test to Patterson, however,
renders an unclear answer. Although a literal reading of section
1981 may not include postcontract racial discrimination, such a pro-
hibition on employers can be found in the "spirit" of the statute.
This point is suggested in Part II of this article. Unlike Holy Trinity
Church, the legislative history in Patterson suggests a broader interpre-
tation of section 1981, rather than the narrow reading afforded the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Similarly, in Weber, the Court gave defer-
ence to legislative intent where a rule is within the literal language of
a statute, but at odds with the intent behind the statute.2 53 Conse-
quently, these decisions argue in favor of the intentionalist approach.
Specifically, this approach is most effective when the legislative in-
tent is clear and a literal reading of the statute renders an unreasona-
ble result or is subject to more than one meaning.
If the legislative intent is clear, an intentionalist approach will
avoid one of the pitfalls created under the public choice theory. Spe-
cifically, the legislative history of a statute like the one analyzed in
Cardoza-Fonseca suggests wide acceptance by Congress, and there-
fore, eliminates, the risk of compromises which tend to distort the
statute's legislative purpose.254 Like Cardoza-Fonseca, clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent reduces the likelihood of judicial poli-
cymaking because this intent limits the judiciary to interpreting
statutes within Congress' clearly established boundaries.
C. A Case for the Dynamic Approach
When circumstances similar to those in Patterson are not conducive
to using a textualist or intentionalist approach, the Court should de-
fer to the "policy of the Nation as formulated by Congress in recent
years .... "255 Deference to current societal, political and legal views
regarding section 1981 becomes more convincing after considering
the alternatives. A literal reading of section 1981 seems at odds with
the expansive interpretation afforded other civil rights legislation. 256
252. Id.
253. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979) (prohibi-
tion against racial discrimination read in light of legislative history and historical con-
text of Civil Rights Act).
254. Cf. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1497-98 (discussing the
dynamic approach).
255. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Be-
cause of Congress' consistent efforts to eliminate racial segregation, the Court has
sympathetically and liberally construed legislation in this area.).
256. The Weber and Johnson decisions have given Title VII an expansive role in
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Furthermore, an excavation of section 198 I's past reveals only bits
and pieces of its legislative history-rendering the statute's purpose
unclear.257 Consequently, a dynamic approach emerges as the form
of statutory interpretation most applicable to Patterson.
The dynamic approach is preferable because it is "more consistent
with modem ideas about interpretation and law, and because it con-
centrates the court's and the parties' attention on the truly relevant
factors."258 One factor to consider is the purpose of section 1981,
and whether a modern interpretation of that section would be dis-
cordant with the Reconstruction Congress' intent to wipe out racial
discrimination. A review of the discussion of the legislative history in
Part II of this article indicates that Congress was concerned with
more than the formation of employment contracts. Congress was
concerned about adverse employment conditions such as corporal
punishment and payment of meager wages or no wages. The Act
was meant to protect African-Americans from the "tyrannical acts,
the tyrannical restrictions, and the tyrannical laws which belong to
the condition of slavery ... ."259 "These conditions represent noth-
ing more than nineteenth-century racial harassment."2 60
Albeit persuasive, the legislative history of the Act in support of
postcontract racial harassment is not conclusive and certainly not in
harmony with a literal reading of the statute. The dynamic approach
to interpreting section 1981 allows other factors to be brought to
bear on the postcontract issue, such as current public policy towards
civil rights.
Although difficult to gauge, public policy can be measured
through the reaction of elected officials to changes in civil rights leg-
policing discrimination of minorities in the work place. Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 645 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
257. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 23, at 22-46 (discussing the archaeological
and nautical approaches).
258. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 65, at 1539. One factor considered
by the Patterson dissent was the contractual expectations of Brenda Patterson in light
of the legislative history. "The right to make contracts of employment comprises a
bundle of rights that includes the rights to deserved promotion, an unhampered
work environment, and substantially equivalent treatment as that of one's co-work-
ers. Without these attendant benefits, an individual's right to contract for employ-
ment is severely abridged and diluted." Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 338-39
(citations omitted). Consequently, the dissent argued that "[a] deliberate policy of
harassment of black employees" would be interpreted as imposing on them a "con-
tractual term... that is not the 'same' as the contractual provisions that are 'enjoyed
by white citizens.'" Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 221 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Such actions produce "manifest discrimination in the mak-
ing of contracts." Id.
259. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866).
260. Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 338 (citation omitted).
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islation26i and to threatened restrictions of existing law by the judici-
ary. 26 2 In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court, several members of
Congress acknowledged their support for an expansive interpreta-
tion of section 1981, stating:
Congress' approval of, and its intent to build upon, this Court's
interpretation of Section 1981 as reaching discrimination by pri-
vate parties are unmistakable. The Congress has been fully cogni-
zant of how Section 1981 has been construed by this Court. It has
rebuffed legislative efforts to reverse that construction; it has ap-
proved and relied on the construction given the statute by this
Court; and it has strengthened Section 1981 as a remedy by making
attorney's fees available to prevailing parties, thereby encouraging
Section 1981's more effective use. Congressional intent could
hardly have been more clear if the Congress had reenacted Section
1981 following Runyon.263
Congress, as the representative of the people, similarly expressed
its desire for strong and effective civil rights laws during the con-
gressional debates on the Civil Rights Bill of 1990, which was in-
tended, in part, to overrule the Patterson decision.2 64 In his address
to Congress, Representative Scheuer stated: "Today, we are called
upon to restore our civil rights laws to their original intent.... Con-
gress now has the opportunity to alleviate the damage done by the
Supreme Court's incorrect interpretations of our civil rights
laws." 2 65 Although the 1990 bill was ultimately vetoed, a majority of
Congress nevertheless agreed with the Reconstruction Congress' in-
tent to eliminate racial animus in the work place and sought to pass
legislation to further that goal.
The statutory interpretation necessary in Patterson illustrates a
model for the use of the dynamic approach. When a statute like sec-
tion 1981 is old and its legislative history does not specifically ad-
dress the current issue, some deference should be given to the
"policy of the Nation as formulated by Congress in recent years
.... 266 This is especially true here, where Congress has been
steadfast in its denunciation of racial harassment.
261. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174.
262. Id. at 203-06.
263. Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioners at 28, Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-107) (footnotes omitted).
264. See 136 CONG. REC. H9975, H9977 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Edwards); 136 CONG. REC. H6724, H6725 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Mfume).
265. 136 CONG. REC. H9975, H9993 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Scheuer).
266. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
also supra note 255.
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CONCLUSION
Patterson signals the end of an era marked by an expansive inter-
pretation of section 1981. The Supreme Court has inflicted a major
setback for civil rights, a setback worse than any since the 1906 deci-
sion in Hodges.
Although the Patterson majority noted that postcontract formation
discrimination is covered under Title VII, they failed to acknowledge
the limitations of Title VII. For instance, Title VII does not cover
businesses with fewer than fifteen employees. Furthermore, Title
VII compensates the injured party only for lost wages. 267 This
leaves a gaping hole in civil rights legislation, 268 one which may take
considerable time and money to correct through the legislative
process.269
The use of the dynamic approach to statutory interpretation would
have prevented this problem. Civil rights legislation passed in the
1960s clearly indicated Congress' intent to prevent racial discrimina-
tion across the board. Furthermore, Congress has sanctioned this
policy through legislative inaction subsequent to the Jones270 and
Runyon271 decisions. Congress reaffirmed this policy after Patterson
in its legislative debates concerning the Civil Rights Bill of 1990.272
The Court has turned a "blind eye" to congressional policy and
public sentiment towards civil rights, steering away from the goal of
a discrimination-free society. Consequently, many African-Ameri-
cans are forced to "suffer silently" in the face of postcontract em-
ployment discrimination.273
William P. Wassweiler
267. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 166.
268. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission estimates that 10.7 million
employees are not covered by Title VII since they work for employers who hire fewer
than 15 employees. Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 596, 602 n.42 (1988).
269. Congress spent a significant amount of time drafting and debating the Civil
Right Bill of 1990. President Bush vetoed this bill in October 1990. See 136 CONG.
REC. S 16,562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (President Bush's veto message to the United
States Senate). The fallout from the 1989 civil rights cases and the demise of the
1990 Civil Rights Bill are already apparent. Rep. Edwards noted that "hundreds of
lawsuits have already been dismissed because of [the 1989 Supreme Court civil rights
decisions]. Countless other [lawsuits] have not even been filed since the Supreme
Court made it virtually impossible to successfully bring an employment discrimina-
tion case." 136 CONG. REC. H9975, H9977 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Edwards).
270. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
271. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
272. See supra note 264.
273. Legal Times, Aug. 7, 1989, at S12.
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